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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

v.

Supreme Court No. 860498
Civil No. 85-8-9605-2

ooOoo
Appellant Karen Marchant herewith submits her Brief in
reply to the new matters raised by Respondent Donald J. Marchant1s
Brief.
INTRODUCTION
In his Reply Brief, Donald J. Marchant has attempted to
hide Judge Tibbs1 misapplication of the law and abuse of discretion behind the veneer that in divorce proceedings, the trial
judge is vested with "broad discretion" in awarding custody and
dividing the marital estate.

The arguments rely on "broad judi-

cial discretion" to sweep under the carpet the court's failure to
follow judicial principles of domestic relations law provided by
the Utah Supreme Court as guidelines for trial courts.
Additionally, novel concepts of morality are raised.

As an examplef the Defendant is reduced to interpreting
the Findings of Fact on custody issues and assuming what the
court may have intended in its ruling due to the lack of clarity
and lack of facts stated.

These Findings of Fact clearly do not

provide a "rational and logical factual basis upon which the
"best interest" of the parties1 children was determined.
Furtherf the Findings of Fact on custody do not relate to who is
functionally the best parent to care for the children.

The

interpretation provided by the Respondent does show the basis for
the moral witch hunt which erroneously deprived Karen Marchant of
custody of the parties1 children, Brandon and Sarahf after 15
months of continuous sole custody.
Defendant's Brief does not address the trial court's
failure to enter Findings of Fact regarding specific standards
used in either granting or denying alimony.

Defendant states

that Karen Marchant was "living beyond her means" which is simply
a misstatement of fact evidenced by Karen Marchant's financial
statement (Plaintiff's Ex. 3 ) . Again, Defendant attempts to void
the abuse of discretion by relying on a broad statement that alimony awards will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion occurred.

Even under this stan-

dard, it is evident the court's failure to award alimony should
be overturned.
With respect to the property awards, Defendant does not
bother to address two issues raised in Plaintiff's Brief:
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that

the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
$20,000.00 personal injury award to Plaintiff which was contributed to the marriage and the court's abuse of discretion in
awarding 8 percent interest on the pay out of the pension plan
rather than the statutory 12 percent required by statute.
Based upon the evidence presented at trial and the Findings of
Fact entered by the Court, it is clear the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion and misapplied the law to the facts.
The broad sweeping generalizations of "judicial discretion"
served up by the Respondent's Brief do not change the trial
court's errors.
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RAISED IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
I.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ON THE CUSTODY ISSUE
SHOW THAT THE COURT DID NOT MAKE A DETERMINATION
OF THE "BEST INTERESTS" OF
BRANDON AND SARAH MARCHANT, MISAPPLIED AND
DID NOT FOLLOW APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARDS
AND ACTED BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Defendant recites the standard factors upon which a
trial court is bound to rely in making custody determinations
found in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), and
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).

(Brief, pp. 12-13.)

However, Defendant fails to show where the trial court applied
these standards to the custody determination which highlights the
difficulty of upholding the award.

Based on the statements in

the Brief, it is clear that the Defendant had to grasp at straws
in supporting the court's findings rather than being able to rely

-^-

on clear factors provided as guidelines by the Utah Supreme
Court.
In Pusey, Justice Durham stated for the court:
"We believe that the choice in competing child
custody claims should instead be based on functionrelated factors. Prominent among these, though not
exclusive, is the identity of the primary caretaker
during the marriage. Other factors should include
the identity of the parent with greater flexibility
to provide personal care for the child and the
identity of the parent with whom the child has
spent most of his or her time pending custody
determination if that period has been lengthy.
Another important factor should be the stability of
the environment provided by each parent." Pusey,
at p. 120.
None of the Findings of Fact show function-related
factors warranting an award of custody of the children to
Defendant.

The Findings of Fact actually show an unwavering bias

towards Mrs. Marchant.
The Findings of Fact do not provide a logical and legal
basis for awarding custody to Don Marchant, a requirement for any
judicial determination.

Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah

1986) .
Since the Findings of Fact do not relate to the principles and guidelines supplied by the court, are not
function-related factors and are simply emblems of prejudice
towards Mrs. Marchant, the Respondent tries to interpret their
meaning and makes a variety of interpretations and unwarranted
assumptions.
Respondent interprets Findings of Fact 5.B. as follows:

-4-

"The Finding supports the court1s apparent conclusion [emphasis added], that Mrs. Marchant's
unjustified acts of selfishness and rebellion and
her unstable and changing moral values were inconsistent with the parental role." Brief, at p. 15.
This interpretation is certainly unwarrar-i-u
language of the

supported by Mie record.

Mrs,

Marchant's "unjustified acts of selfishness ai.-. -^beilion" wat,
deciding to obtain a divorce from a man she did not 1ove, with
whom she was sexually and finai iciall y i ncompatible, who continually criticized her choice of clothing and who t L ,"io occasion knocked her i.

;

as with a blow to the face.

This

Finding does not relate to anything having to do witli the best
interests of the children.
Finding of Fact

•'.•••;s a prejudicial statement about

Mrs. Marchant and her ^L-inrt;. r- ; ~o with Mrs. Marchant's sister,
Helen, who is characterized as b"1.^
further makes a vague statement, " •--•

a divorced woman".

it

•. indard of living

under which Plaintiff has been residing while having temporary
custody of the children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what it
should have been nor was it in the best interests of the
children."
Respondent interprets this as the Court concluding that
living with her aunt and cousins under one roof is an
inappropriate atmosphere in which to raise children and that the
court "disapproved of the communa.. J restyle."
This Finding by the Court is not supported by the evidence in the record despite Respondent's novel interpretation of

the language.

Elizabeth Stewart found that the children were

well adjusted and recommended that the Court maintain the status
quo.

(Defendant's Ex. 9, Recommendation/ p. 3.)

No evidence was

introduced to show any abnormal behavior or below standard living
conditions.

The fact that Helen did some mothering while Mrs.

Marchant was at work does not support the vague finding that the
conditions were not what they should have been.

The issue is

immediately raised that if Helen's mothering, who is the
children's maternal auntf makes the standard of living
unsuitable, it logically follows that the conditions will be less
suitable when Mr. Marchant hires an unrelated caretaker for the
children to fulfill his custody obligations while he is at work.
Finding of Fact 5.D., that Mrs. Marchant became involved
with another man in the latter part of the marriage is
interpreted as reflecting on Mrs. Marchant's "moral character".
The only evidence offered in the trial was testimony by Mrs.
Marchant of her friendship with Don Fonnesbeck and Mr. Marchant's
testimony of an assumed affair of sorts.

Mr. Marchant was admit-

tedly jealous of Mrs. Marchant's boss and threatened by his occasional gifts to her which Mrs. Marchant honestly disclosed and
brought home.

There was no evidence of sexual involvement and

she denied ever having stated she had anything more than a
friendship with her boss.

If she was sexually attracted, the

evidence shows her moral strength in avoiding sexual relations.
One thing is clear:

The evidence does not show she was immoral
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in any respect or has a poor no* •

•' -•

- ei.

n'i» evidence on

her "relationship" with no*. Fonnesbeck, does not ; -.. \e f o the
function-related fact «

:i are to be determined

i custody

issues.
< ng of Fact 5.C. is accurate in the sense that in
the latter years of the marriage, Mrs. Marchant decide:! -•- i > to
work, became involved in her job and was occasionally
weekends which necessitated Don Marchant taking
church alone.

:

V

*-•

jn

children to

However, these changes were consistent with Iler 110

longer iM\in>i her husband and deciding on a divorce and wei
motivated by selfishness.

not

testified:

"My career aspirations were to be a wife and
mother. And a job is nice and I am grateful that I
enjoy my work. But I certainly wouldn't term
myself a career girl or woman, ~r whatever. I am
grateful that I enjoy my work." (Transcript p. 60# L.
12-16. )
However, she recognized i- t *ie event or divorce, she
would have to

•* to support the children and herself,

Find

-

that a woman who is unhappy in her marriage and recognizes a need
to work as "being selfish," is inappropriate by penalizing her
based on the decision to divorce.

In other words, the presump-

tion would be that any person who does not want a divorce or who
fails to recognize a problem in marriage will be a better caretaker for the children.

This kind of punitive adjudication based

upon classifications unrelated to child rea: -.'•-* was specifically
disavowed by the Utah Supreme Court .

Pusey v. Pusey, supra.,

which overturned gender-based preferences.

TII«

unfortunate

travesty by the court in this matter is that Mrs. Marchant was
deprived of custody of Sarah and Brandon based upon factors which
were unrelated to standards and principles which the court has
stated should control custody determinations.

On balance, the

"prominent function-related factors" in Puseyf strongly favored
Mrs. Marchant but were ignored entirely by the Court.
Mrs. Marchant had been the primary caretaker during the
marriage.

Mrs. Marchant had been sole custodial parent for the

15 months prior to the divorce.

Elizabeth Stewart, in her

evaluation, stated that:
"There is a preference for leaving the custody
arrangement in place where it is clear that they
have made a good adjustment and there is no reason
to think that they are not doing well or that a
different custody arrangement would be better for
them."
Elizabeth Stewart also states:
"Since the children are doing well in the mother's
custody at the present time, the least disruptive
placement would be to leave them in her custody."
(Defendant's Ex. 9, Recommendations, p. 3.)
Where most factors are equal, the court's failure
to rely on "prominent" factors enunciated by the Utah Supreme
Court and instead go on a prejudicial "moral" hunt, was an abuse
of discretion.
II.
FAILURE TO AWARD KAREN MARCHANT ALIMONY
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
While Plaintiff agrees with the legal standard to be
considered by the trial court in making its determination
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regarding an award of alimony, she wholly disagrees with the
statement of evidence in the Brief.

(Brief, pp. 20-21.)

The

trial court failed to enter Findings of Fact relating to the
standard.

The situation is similar to Jones v. Jones, 700 P.

1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), where the Court noted that the trial
court had failed to analyze the circumstances of the parties in
light of the three factors and overturned the court's alimony
award as being wholly inadequate.
In his Brief, Donald Marchant admits that he makes
$793.00 per month net more than the Defendant.

However, he indi-

cates that Plaintiff's only indication of "need" was her express
desire to return to school, which is incorrect.

Defendant's

Financial Declaration (Plaintiff's Ex. 3) shows expenses which
significantly exceed her income.

Even if these expenses are

reduced by taking the needs of the children away from the
figuresf her income is still insufficient to meet her minimal
needs, and this is especially true where she desires to continue
her education which would be a significant additional expense.
It is clearly inequitable to have recognized that Karen Marchant
supported Don Marchant through his schooling during the marriage
and when Karen Marchant desires further education, to deprive her
of the ability to obtain that where there is a significant difference in economic earning power.
Don Marchant also notes that he is saddled with "the
lion's share of marital debts totaling $32,800.00."

This Court

should note that the debt on the truck in the amount of
$11,000.00 was voluntarily assumed under Stipulation by the
Defendant and he received that property.
p.13.)

(Transcript, L. 3-5,

Next, Mr. Marchant assumed a loan in the amount of

$14,000.00 from his father, M.A. Marchant.

His testimony with

respect to the loan is that he did not sign a Promissory Note for
that amount and it is payable only "when I can get it".
(Transcript, L. 6-17, p.104.) Regarding the $5,000.00 amount owed
on the trailer, Mr. Marchant testified he was selling the trailer
since he was living in the family's home in Central, Utah, that
he had previously agreed to pay the debt and presumably would
relatively quickly be liquidated by the sale of the trailer.
(Transcript, L. 18-25, p. 26; L. 1-3, p. 77.)

The "lion's

share" of the marital debt, after deducting these items out,
amounts to $5,800.00.

(Defendant's Ex. 10.)

The Defendant has mischaracterized Karen Marchant's
income allowing her to live as she desires in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

Don Marchant, in his Brief, states that $1,321.00 per

month of net income of Karen Marchant allowed her to live in the
area she selected with the children and did not seek temporary
alimony.

Karen was able to do this with the aid of the monthly

child support payments from Don Marchant in the amount of
$400.00.

Her income for purposes of expenses was, thus,

increased to $1,721.00 per month.
The Defendant's assertion that it was evident that both
parties were living beyond their means is not supported by the
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Karen Marchantfs Financial Declaration (Plaintiff's

record.

Ex. 3) does not bear this out nor does any other factors or
statements introduced in the record.

In fact, on a comparative

level, it was clear that Mrs. Marchant was not living according
to the standard to which she had become accustomed during the
marriage, in a spacious home provided by her husband.

She was

being forced to share quarters with her sister and nephew to cut
expenses.
The court's failure to analyze the standard for awarding
alimony presents the situation in Jones v. Jones, supra., which
allows this court to review the factors warranting alimony independently.

Based on this standard, Karen Marchant is clearly

entitled to alimony.
III.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE PROPERTY DIVISION
Don Marchant's Point IV regarding property distribution
fails to address two salient issues raised in Karen Marchant1s
appeal:

The trial court failed to consider $20,000.00 in per-

sonal injury awards made to Karen Marchant which were contributed
to the marriage and the court's awarding 8 percent interest
rather than 12 percent interest on the Judgment requiring payment
of one-third of the pension plan money over a ten-year period.
The court was under an obligation to give due consideration to
the personal injury awards in dividing the property.
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980).

Kerr v.

Plaintiff Karen Marchant has addressed the issue of the
actual amount of marital debt which Don Marchant assumed in the
immediately preceding portion of this Brief.

Examination of

those debts assumed by Don Marchant only further reinforces Karen
Marchant1s position that the property award was inequitable.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant's interpretation for this court of the
Findings of Fact regarding custody clarify the position of Karen
Marchant that the court wholly misapplied the law and ignored
"prominent factors" which clearly were controlling the custody
issue.

The monetary factors and needs of the parties raised by

the Respondent also clearly indicate the court's abuse of discretion in failing to award alimony to Karen Marchant.

Finally, the

Defendant's failure to address the issues raised in Plaintiff's
Brief regarding the inequitable property distribution underscores
the attempt to sweep all abuses of discretion away behind the
facade of "broad judicial discretion" in domestic relations proceedings.

This Court should reverse the trial court's award of

custody to Don Marchant, enter an appropriate award of alimony
and property to Karen Marchant as warranted by the facts.
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DATED this

#

day of May, 1987.
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